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Abstract 
 
In this paper I want to describe one way of thinking about information. In effect, 
this paper relates to the notion that organizational or societal models of economic 
equilibrium incorporate a decision-making mechanism that is influenced by the 
independent judgment of each individual. 
This decision-making mechanism has nothing to do with the notion of acting to maximize 
one's expected utility under a set of exogenous prices or predictions, nor are the 
consequences of the decisions based on this mechanism related in any way to exogenous 
prices, predictions, or other parameters. In terms of information theory, the goal 
is to generate information and make more accurate predictions about a particular 
condition. However, the information itself can be fundamentally flawed. Another point 
is that information generated for this purpose has the feature of being irreversible. 
If communication is defined as a process of engaging in an economic activity while 
observing and analyzing information generated on the basis of the above mechanism, 
then it is worth considering whether communication so defined has any utility from 
an economic standpoint. To pursue this question, I will apply the concept postulated 
above to theories of economic organization and pricing, and also discuss the 
externality which information brings into an economy. 
 
JEL classification: A1, B4, C0, D0, D6, D7, D8 
Key words: Autonomy, Information, Interaction, Communication, Externality of 
Information, Herd behavior 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I want to describe one way of thinking about information. In effect, 
this paper relates to the notion that organizational or societal models of economic 
equilibrium incorporate a decision-making mechanism that is influenced by the 
independent judgment of each individual. 
 
This decision-making mechanism has nothing to do with the notion of acting to maximize 
one's expected utility under a set of exogenous prices or predictions, nor are the 
consequences of the decisions based on this mechanism related in any way to exogenous 
prices, predictions, or other parameters. In terms of information theory, the goal 
is to generate information and make more accurate predictions about a particular 
condition. However, the information itself can be fundamentally flawed. Another point 
is that information generated for this purpose has the feature of being irreversible. 
 
If communication is defined as a process of engaging in an economic activity while 
observing and analyzing information generated on the basis of the above mechanism, 
then it is worth considering whether communication so defined has any utility from 
an economic standpoint. To pursue this question, I will apply the concept postulated 
above to theories of economic organization and pricing, and also discuss the 
externality which information brings into an economy. 
 
 
 4 
2. Central Thesis 
 
First, an attempt is made, from the perspective of maximizing expected utility, to 
identify the conditions under which each autonomous economic agent in an economic 
organization or community is able to retain its independent judgmental capacity. This 
entails introducing parameters that describe the independence (judgmental power) of 
each agent, and utilizing a two-dimensional model to derive all conditions from 
conditional probabilities based on the information sets that each agent is able to 
utilize. In other words, an effort is made to derive conditions for the existence 
of situations (stages) under which it is considered better to exercise one's own, 
independent judgmental power on the basis of one's autonomy, in addition to the 
conventional notion of maximizing one's expected utility after scrutinizing 
parameters indicative of external conditions (e.g., prices and / or the outcomes of 
judgments made by other agents). In such situations, it is possible for the outcome 
of the agent's judgment and the parameters of external conditions to lose their 
correlations and be transformed into factors conducive to wild price fluctuations 
or other unstable situations. It is accordingly plausible to conceive of two 
scenarios: one in which autonomy is the priority of each agent, and efforts to maintain 
equilibrium are dynamic and independent; and another in which priority is placed on 
acting in accordance with external parameters, and the efforts to maintain equilibrium 
are based on a static or fixed strategy. Although the (dynamic) scenario of autonomy 
is marked by a certain degree of probabilistic instability, from an information theory 
standpoint it is assumed that it also generates information that allows for a more 
accurate prediction of trends in the real world. 
 
First, let us consider the influences that communication or interaction by agents 
within an economic organization can have on the decision-making mechanism. One role 
of an economic organization is to collect information under conditions of uncertainty, 
screen that information and utilize it to make more accurate predictions about the 
world, and ultimately improve the organization's expected utility. The decision by 
an individual as to whether or not to exercise independent judgment is based on 
individual utility maximization. However, as information, the results of that 
independent judgment will be of value to the organization to which that individual 
belongs irrespective of whether it was accurate or not. More specifically, independent 
judgments can lead to more accurate predictions of a situation in the real world, 
in turn improving the expected utility of the organization as a whole. Conversely, 
the results of strategy-driven judgments have no value as information to the 
organization; moreover, if individuals (economic agents) within the organization 
interact or communicate with each other, they are likely to learn of the results of 
(independent) decisions made by one or more other individuals and inevitably lose 
some or all incentive to make independent decisions of their own. Although the 
independent judgmental power of the individual is crucial to the organization at large, 
the processes of communication within the organization inform individuals of the 
independent decisions made by others and undermine their incentive to make independent 
decisions of their own. It is within this paradoxical framework that the decisions 
of the organization (committees, hierarchies, etc.) are made. 
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Next, let us consider the economic implications of communication in terms of the theory 
of pricing. It is not always apparent that information generated during a stage of 
equilibrium will be linearly related to the effectiveness it has in boosting expected 
utility (welfare) on a general scale within an organization or community that is 
risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, it is to be expected that an organization 
or community comprising a heterogeneous mixture of individuals and an incomplete 
information set will fall into a quasi-steady state whether it is risk-neutral or 
not, and be confronted by disparities in its actual and predicted equilibrium prices. 
Consequently, this is a problem difficult to fully appreciate in analytical terms. 
 
It is assumed in this paper that speculation is an economic behavior that involves 
acting in accord with new predictions that are based on the invocation of autonomy 
(independent judgmental power) and discontinuous jumps in the prediction equation 
[P(M=1 | Φi(T-1)) = βi]. Speculative behavior was once thought to be the province 
of certain special types of people: i.e., risk-loving individuals characterized by 
convex utility functions. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, even 
people who adhere to a risk-neutral or risk-averse economic rationale are capable 
of exercising their autonomy and engaging in speculation. Accordingly, in this context 
it is also shown that autonomy (independent judgmental power) can have a disruptive 
(negative) impact on community welfare. 
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3. Basic model of independent Judgement 
      
First of all, I model what the independence is essentially like. There exist two states 
in the world, Mode 1 and Mode 0. Mode 1 is a “good” state and Mode 0 is a “bad” state. 
These states are represented as a binary variable, M. (M=1 for Mode 1 and M=0 for 
Mode 0.) An agent i, when he or she receives the input of this variable, M, judges 
by its own criteria whether this variable is in a “good” or “bad” state, and outputs 
its own decision whether to approve or reject it. I denote this binary output variable 
by Di. (Di=1 for approval, Di=0 for rejection.) This independent decision making 
process easily proves to be equivalent to the binary communication channel as shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
Considering that every agent is fallible, and that it is natural to think that the 
probability of approval when a “good” state is input, P(Di=1|M=1)ºP1i, is greater than 
the probability of approval when a “bad” state is input, P(Di=1|M=0)ºP0i, I assume 
0< P0i< P1i<1. According to the information theory, the mutual information of this 
binary channel, I(M; Di) is positive because P0¹ Pi. This means that one time 
independent decision making produces positive bits of information which makes the 
prediction regarding the value of M more sure. 
 
I also define the initial probabilistic portion of a “good” state as a. That is, 
P(M=1)=a. I assume that a is a public information known to all agents. However, in 
the course of the “interaction”, each agent can observe all or a part of decisions 
which were made in the past by him or herself or by other agents. 
 
In general, defining the information set of independent decisions which agent i can 
observe at time t=T, as Fi(T-1), the conditional probability of M=1, held by agent 
i, is denoted as P(M=1|Fi(T-1)). Needless to say, P(M=1|Fi(0))=P(M=1)=a. 
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4. Communication (Interaction) 
 
Now let us assume that an agent can observe the consequences of other agents' judgment 
(decision making) in an economic organization or a society. Then how would each agent 
behave him or herself interactively with others agents? 
 
I assume two ways of decision making. One way is to output its "independent" decision, 
DiT, through the model of independence explained in Chapter 3. (i denotes i's agent, 
and T denotes the round when communication is held.) The other is to output the decision 
so that it might simply maximize the agent's own expected payoff, given an available 
information set and exogenous variables like prices. Superficially this output is 
the same as that of an independent decision in the form of a signal, but different 
in the process of decision making. Therefore I call this kind of output "a strategic 
decision" and define it as SiT. As I already explain in Chapter 3, the consequence 
of an independent decision holds a positive bit of information in terms of information 
theory, and influences the next round's prediction regarding the state of the world. 
But it is not related in any way to an existing information set nor exogenous parameters 
like prices. On the other hand, the consequence of a strategic decision itself does 
not hold any information since simply it is the result from a utility maximization 
process. I also define the cost of an independent decision making as CI, which is 
considered to be the cost needed to think and judge by him or herself and to make 
his or her own decision, therefore which should be nonnegative. 
 
Let us also define the consequence of a final judgment of an organization or a society 
as DoT. These variables (DiT, SiT, DoT) are all binary ones. 
 
Each agent has its own payoff function, whose general form is represented by PiT(DiT=k, 
M=j, DOT=m) in an independent decision, and PiT(SiT=k, M=j, DOT=m) in a strategic 
decision. k, j, m are respectively 1 or 0. Let us also define the available information 
set for agent i at round T as Fi(T-1), the total information set an organization or 
a society holds, as F(T-1), assuming Fi(T-1)ÎF(T-1)º{Dit}t=0,1, ..,T-1, "i. For 
simplicity, we assume that the payoff function does not depend on any final judgment 
of an organization or a society, therefore has a form represented by PiT(DiT=k, M=j) 
or PiT(SiT=k, M=j). 
 
At round T, agent i thus chooses the one option which maximizes its own expected payoff 
among the followings; 
 I: to take an independent decision, DiT. 
    S1: to take a strategic decision, SiT=1. 
 S0: to take a strategic decision, SiT=0. 
 
Thus the expected payoff of agent i for taking an independent decision, Di, is; 
 E(PiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))-Ci 
 = P(DiT=1, M=1|Fi(T-1))PiT(DiT=1, M=1)+P(DiT=1, M=0|Fi(T-1))PiT(DiT=1, M=0) 
  +P(DiT=0,M=1|Fi(T-1))PiT(DiT=0, M=1)+P(DiT=0, M=0|Fi(T-1))PiT(DiT=0, M=0)-Ci 
 = P(M=1|Fi(T-1)){P(DiT=1|M=1)PiT(DiT=1, M=1)+P(DiT=0|M=1)PiT(DiT=0, M=1)} 
 +P(M=0|Fi(T-1)){P(DiT=1|M=0)PiT(DiT=1,M=0)+P(DiT=0|M=0)PiT(DiT=0, M=0)}-Ci 
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On the other hand, the expected payoff of agent i for taking a strategic decision, 
Si, is; 
 E(PiT(SiT=k, M)½Fi(T-1)) 
 = P(M=1|Fi(T-1))PiT(SiT=k, M=1) + P(M=0|Fi(T-1))PiT(SiT=k, M=0) 
 
Here I used the following formulas; 
 P(BÇC½A)=P(B½A)P(C½AÇB) 
 P(DiT=k½M=j, Fi(T-1))=P(DiT=k½M=j) 
 
Next, I define the difference of the expected payoff among I, S1 and S0 as; 
 Di(I, S1)º {E(PiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))-Ci}-E(PiT(SiT=1, M)½Fi(T-1)) 
 Di(I, S0)º {E(PiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))-Ci}-E(PiT(SiT=0, M)½Fi(T-1)) 
 Di(S1, S0)º E(PiT(SiT=1, M)½Fi(T-1))-E(PiT(SiT=0, M)½Fi(T-1)) 
 
Here I put the following assumption. 
 
[Assumption] 
The payoff function of each agent does not explicitly include Do T, the consequence 
of a decision making as a total organization or a society. It also has a common form 
for all agents and all rounds, i.e., PiT(DiT=k, M=j)=PiT(SiT=k, M=j)=Pkj ("k, j). The 
cost of an independent decision is zero, i.e., Ci=0. 
 
Then assuming AºP11-P01>0, BºP00-P10>0, bºP(M=1|F(T-1)) =P(M=1|Fi(T-1))ºbi, we can 
rewrite them as following; 
 Di(I, S1)= -b(1-P1i)A+(1-b)(1-P0i)B 
 Di(I, S0)= bP1iA-(1-b)P0iB 
 Di(S1, S0)= bA-(1-b)B 
 
Thus the condition that agent i chooses I (taking an independent decision, DiT) at 
round T is; 
 Di(I, S1)= -b(1-P1i)A+(1-b)(1-P0i)B>0 
 Di(I, S0)= bP1iA-(1-b)P0iB>0 
 
 Rewriting this, we get; 
 P1i-1>X(P0i-1) 
 P1i>XP0i   
where Xº{(1-b)B}/{bA}>0 (Xiº{(1-bi)B}/{biA}) 
 
This condition is shown in Figure 2. 
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5. Examples of communication (Interaction) 
 
Let us examine how each agent's judgmental process would be influenced by other agents' 
results within an homogeneous organization or a society. I assume by the term 
"homogeneous" that every agent shares the same payoff function and the same parameters 
for an independent decision. That is, Pi(Di=k, M=j)=Pi(Si=k, M=j)=Pkj ("i,k, j), P1i=P1, 
P0i =P0  ("i). Additionally assume that the cost for an independent decision is zero, 
i.e., Ci=0, so that the incentive for an independent decision (taking I) might be 
the biggest possible. 
 
Let us also assume that an agent can observe another (just one) agent's independent 
decision output, Di-1. Then the simple calculation gives area maps which tells the 
option to take among I, S1 and S0 respectively for Di-1= 1, Di-1=0 andα=1, α=0.5, α
=0. 
 
Under these conditions, a “chain reaction” can be observed within an organization. 
For example, assume a=0.5, P1=0.8 and P0=0.1. Also assume that an agent takes an 
independent decision and outputs D=1. Then all other agents who observe this judgment 
would subsequently take S1 (taking a strategic decision, S=1), which gives them the 
best expected payoff. This means that all other agents abandon to produce their own 
independent decision making function, and results from these strategic decision 
making are worthless information even though they are right judgments. I call this 
phenomenon a positive chain reaction. For another example, assume a=0.5, P1=0.9 and 
P0=0.2. Also assume that agent 1 takes an independent decision and outputs D=0. Then 
all other agents who observe this judgment would subsequently take S0 (taking a 
strategic decision, S=0). This means that all other agents abandon to produce their 
own independent decision making function, and results from these strategic decision 
making are worthless information even though they are right judgments. I call this 
phenomenon a negative chain reaction. A chain reaction defined here is considered 
to be sort of a herd behavior in decision making mechanism. 
 
[Proposition] 
Under the assumptions described above, there cannot exist any condition in which the 
strictly best choice for an agent is always to take I (taking an independent decision, 
D) regardless of the outputs of other agents' independent decisions.  
 
(Proof) 
The condition in which the strictly best choice for an agent is always to take I (taking 
an independent decision, D) is; 
 Di(I, S1)= -bi (1-P1i)A+(1-bi)(1-P0i)B>0 (1) 
 Di(I, S0)= bi P1iA-(1-bi)P0iB>0     (2) 
where 
 b1ºP(M=1|Di-1=1)= aP1aP1 + 1- a( )P0  
 b0ºP(M=1|Di-1=0)=
a 1 - P1( )
a 1 - P1( )+ 1- a( ) 1- P0( ) 
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Since either of (1) and (2) must hold for both cases, bi=b1 and bi=b0, 
 bi=b1： (1) ⇔ -αP1(1-P1)A+(1-α) P0(1- P0)B>0    (a)  
(2) ⇔ αP12A-(1-α) P02B>0            (b) 
 
 bi=b0： (1) ⇔  -α(1-P1)2A+(1-α) (1-P0)2B>0      (c)  
   (2) ⇔ αP1(1-P1)A-(1-α) P0(1- P0)B>0     (d) 
 
Clearly (a) and (d) does not hold at the same time. Then proof is done. 
 
This proposition holds also in the case that an agent can observe the outputs of more 
than one agents' independent decisions. 
 
Conventional theories assume that each individual in an organization always makes 
its decisions in an independent manner. On this understanding, it is assumed that 
unless it is primarily concerned about its management costs, an organization can 
expect to reduce its probability of making erroneous decisions (usually expressed 
as type-1 or type-2 errors) and increase its expected profits the larger the number 
of individuals who belong to it. Conversely, the variation (dispersion) of profits 
will be reduced. In reality, though, the ideal size will be determined by the tradeoffs 
attributable to climbing management costs as the number of individuals in an 
organization increases. 
 
However, as observed earlier, it is clear that each of the active agents within an 
organization will be inclined to readily relinquish their autonomy (independent 
judgment) and adopt strategy-based decisions if they communicate with their peers 
within the organization. Consequently, in this case, it may be concluded that in 
contrast to conventional theory, the probability of judgmental error will not diminish 
as the organization grows larger, nor will the organization experience an increase 
in expected profits or a decrease in profit variation. 
 
Let us consider the situation in a committee that does not rely on communication, 
and whose final decisions are based on consensus by a majority of their individual 
members. If we let decision-making by the committee be DT, and the payoff for the 
committee as a whole be defined as ΠT(DT=k, M=j), then DT will be 1 when a majority 
of the committee's individual members are in consensus, and zero in all other cases. 
If interaction (communication) is not a matter for consideration, then, in keeping 
with the law of large numbers, the probability of making an erroneous decision will 
approach a limit of zero the larger the number of individuals, N, on the committee. 
Now, for comparison, consider a committee that does value interaction (communication) 
and whose members have opportunities to weigh the independent views or decisions of 
their peers. Also, let us assume that α=0.5 and P1=1-P0 in the equation described 
above. For this scenario, it seems clear that the outcome of the first judgment 
independently made by an individual on the committee will be relayed in a chain 
reaction to all other committee members, and ultimately be adopted as a decision by 
the entire committee. In this case, the probability of making an erroneous decision 
will not be any smaller than that for a committee of one individual; consequently, 
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there will be no increase in expected profits. 
 
As the above example demonstrates, in an age of uncertainty where corporations and 
other organizations or communities are compelled to make decisions about the 
orientation of their future management strategy, decision-making mechanisms that 
place value on interaction (communication) can lose their effectiveness depending 
on the structure of the decision-making committee or hierarchy. 
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6. Model of Equilibrium Pricing Incorporating Autonomy 
 in a Risk-neutral World 
 
An economic agent with autonomy continuously chooses the best option in terms of an 
expected payoff among an independent decision and strategic decisions, while always 
observing prices and predictions regarding the state of the world. Therefore it is 
definitely necessary to construct models of equilibrium pricing under such courses.1 
2 
 
Thus, in this chapter I construct the interactive pricing model at the risk neutral 
world on the basis of the interactive decision making process mainly explained in 
Chapter 4. The algorithm is shown in Appendix-C. 
 
First of all, we assume that there exist the binary states of the world, a "good" 
state (M=1) and a "bad" state (M=0), and also assume that there exists a portfolio 
which would produce one unit of payoff at a "good" state and zero unit of payoff at 
a "bad" state. Since the real state of the world is not revealed for the moment, each 
agent just predicts the state of the world from the probabilistic point of view, based 
on its available information set.  
 
Based on this model, I made Monte-Carlo simulation. Results are following.  
 
[Properties] 
7. The average of an equilibrium prediction is strongly and positively correlated 
with an equilibrium price, but is not necessarily the same.  
8. The variance of an equilibrium price is larger than that of the average of an 
equilibrium prediction.  
9. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the degree of interaction and the average 
increase in an individual "subjective" welfare at an homogeneous system. At a 
system whose individual judgmental capacity is relatively low (P1=0.55) , the 
average increase in an individual "subjective" welfare is an increasing function 
with the degree of interaction. On the other hand, at a system whose individual 
judgmental capacity is relatively high (P1=0.65), the average increase in an 
individual "subjective" welfare is a decreasing function with the degree of 
                                            
1  This pricing process can be regarded as a discontinuous, instantaneous and 
microscopic shift (jump) in a competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium on account of the 
production of information. 
2 The point we must be very careful of is that the price of a portfolio itself is 
described as the function of all agents’ predictions regarding the state of the world. 
Therefore, an agent may get a positive bit of information regarding the state of the 
world through the price as well as through other agents’ independent decisions. 
However, to make our arguments simpler, we set an assumption that in all the 
microscopic competitive (Walrasian) pricing processes used in this paper, the agent 
may get information only through other agents’ independent decisions, if observable. 
This simplification, for sure, does not distort the essence of our arguments. 
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interaction. In either cases, the average increase in an individual "subjective" 
welfare decreases with the degree of interaction where the degree of interaction 
is very strong (L≒N-1). 
Since the average increase in an individual objective welfare is always zero, 
as explained in 4., this increase is an irrational result from an incompleteness 
of individual's information, and it remains as an incorrect expected payoff until 
the state of the world is truly revealed.     
10. When the prediction regarding the state of the world is equal to the current price, 
then this agent is the most likely to take I (an independent decision). Especially, 
assuming zero cost of communication, the agent always takes I. 
11. The average of an individual "objective" welfare is always 0 at the equilibrium. 
(This is a natural result from the assumption of risk neutrality.) 
12. The larger the degree of "interaction", the longer the time to an equilibrium 
becomes. 
13. At an economic system which shares a complete information, there does not exist 
an equilibrium. That is, even though the prediction regarding the state of the 
world is almost sure (biTºP(M=1|Fi(T-1))=1 or 0), the system can never arrive 
at an equilibrium and a pricing process fluctuates for ever. This is a totally 
different point from a risk averse world.   
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7. Model of Equilibrium Pricing Incorporating Autonomy  
in a risk-averse world 
 
In Appendix B, in order to examine the effect on society of exercising autonomy 
(independent judgement) in a risk-averse world, we consider the case with 2 agents 
and 2 types (a type which always makes strategic judgements, and another type which 
always makes independent judgements). In actuality, an autonomous economic agent 
would be expected to make subjective forecasts regarding price and state, observe 
her own endowment, and then take the economic action of making an autonomous selection 
between two choices: where strategic judgement would result in higher expected utility, 
the agent would make a strategic judgement, while the agent would make an independent 
judgement in the event that this would result in higher expected utility. Therefore 
it is necessary to construct a price equilibrium model which incorporates a mechanism 
for reaching equilibrium given such a decision-making process. In other words, we 
require a price equilibrium model under uncertainty which incorporates autonomous 
judgement functions based on economic rationality.3 4 
 
Thus, in this chapter we construct a pricing theory model for a risk averse world. 
We define a binary variable to represent the state, with M=1 representing a 'good' 
state, and M=0 representing a 'bad' state. We also consider 2 portfolios. The first 
is a risk-free portfolio. The second is a risky portfolio where the pay-off is 
influenced by the prevailing state. All (N) agents are risk-averse and share common 
utility functions of the following forms.6 
 
 ui(x1)ºg1(x1)1-a   (Portfolio 1) 
 uij(x2)ºg2j(x2)1-a   (Portfolio 2, State M=j (j=0,1)) 
 'a' represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
An algorithm for a price equilibrium model incorporating autonomy in a risk-averse 
world is presented in Appendix C. 
 
Simulations were conducted based on the above model. The following is a summary of 
properties of this model. 
 
Properties of Equilibrium Model in Risk-Averse World 
 
1. In a homogeneous system where the ability to exercise independent judgement is 
low, independent judgement will not be exercised in the equilibrium outcome. This 
is the same as for traditional equilibrium models. 
2. Once the ability to exercise independent judgement exceeds a certain threshold 
value, independent judgement will be exercised (see Figure 5). 
3. The higher the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the higher the threshold 
                                            
3 Same as the footnote 2. 
4 Same as the footnote 3. 
6 We adopt a state dependent utility function. 
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value beyond which independent judgement will be exercised. 
4. In a homogenous system, if we assume identical initial forecasts and identical 
initial endowments, objective welfare will decrease in equilibrium as a result of 
the exercising of independent judgement (see Figure 6). 
In a homogenous system with identical initial forecasts and identical initial 
endowments, the initial state is Pareto optimal, and the system is initially at its 
competitive equilibrium. Therefore, the invocation of autonomy (independent 
judgment) will lead to variations in prediction (disruptive effect) and, regardless 
of the favorable or unfavorable nature of the situation, ultimately distort the 
portfolio balance under conditions of equilibrium, and reduce the amount of objective 
welfare. However, if the initial conditions are not identical and already marked by 
significant variation, the invocation of autonomy (independent judgment) will 
effectively consolidate the predictions of each individual in the system, ultimately 
eliminating disruptions in the portfolio balance, identifying the correct price range, 
and contributing to an increase in objective welfare. To rephrase, the invocation 
of autonomy has the effect of disrupting (reducing) objective welfare during the 
transition from a stage of predictive ambiguity to a stage in which actual conditions 
are clearly known. However, this process eventually leads to a quasi-steady state 
of competitive equilibrium that is not necessarily Pareto optimal nor even preferable. 
5. In a homogenous system where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is low, 
a non-linear region exists where the ability to exercise independent judgement is 
low and where subjective welfare exceeds actual welfare. Such a region does not exist 
in homogenous systems where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is high (see 
Figure 6). 
As can be seen in Figure 6, in the case where the true state is bad (M=0), in the 
region in which the ability to exercise independent judgement is low, that is, where 
P1=0.65-0.85, despite the fact that objective welfare (Ro) is actually decreasing as 
a result of the exercising of autonomy (independent judgement), subjective welfare 
(RS) is increasing significantly. This phenomenon is observed when the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion a is low (in Figure 5, a=0.1). This average increase in 
subjective welfare (RS) arises from the fact that each agent has incomplete 
information, and is an irrational increase in expected utility which vanishes when 
the true state is revealed, but if the true state is not revealed after the equilibrium 
is reached, this expectation may remain for a considerable time in the mental image 
held by each agent. 
6. In a homogenous system where agents share perfect information, an equilibrium 
exists, and both prices and subjective welfare reflect the true state. 
 
In order to examine the effect on society of exercising this type of autonomy 
(independent judgement) in a risk-averse world, we consider the case with 2 agents. 
The two agents i (i=1,2) share common utility functions of the following forms. 
 
 ui(x1)ºg1(x1)1-a   (Portfolio 1) 
 uij(x2)ºg2j(x2)1-a   (Portfolio 2, State M=j (j=0,1)) 
 'a' represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
There are two possible types for each agent: 
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Type 1: Agent has no autonomy and always makes a strategic judgement. 
Type 2*: Agent is autonomous, and under given prices, always compares the strategic 
judgement with the independent judgement, choosing the alternative which results in 
the highest expected utility. 
 
For simplicity, assume g1=1.0, g21=1.5, g20=0.5, a=0.5. 
Also, if initial endowments are set to E11=E21=1.0+s and E12=E22=1.0-s and the prices 
of each portfolio are set to q1=q2=1.0, then the initial endowments satisfy the Pareto 
optimality conditions irrespective of whether M=1 (good state) or M=0 (bad state), 
and the competitive equilibrium conditions are satisfied if an initial forecast of 
a is assumed (i.e. for case where autonomy is not exercised). (Only the price of the 
risky portfolio, q2, does not reflect the true state (q2=1.5 if M=1, q2=0.5 if M=0).) 
This indicates the exercising of autonomy (independent judgement) by a Type 2* 
individual acts to distort the optimal allocation of resources for society as a whole, 
and thus the exercising of autonomy (independent judgement) has negative economic 
value for society as a whole. While the case where the initial allocations are already 
Pareto optimal may be viewed as a somewhat special case, it is achieved as a competitive 
equilibrium in a situation where there is no imbalance in information (both agents 
use an initial forecast of a), and is chosen in order to focus on the disruptive effect 
of autonomy (independent judgement). 
 
We now consider 2 cases.  
 
Case A: where Individual 1 is of Type 1 and Individual 2 is of Type 2* with independent 
judgement parameter P1 (= 1-P0). 
 
Assume initial endowments of E11=E21=1.0+s and E12=E22=1.0-s.  
Figure 7 shows the objective welfare ratio (Ro), as a function of P1, for each 
individual and for society as a whole when s=0, that is, when Individuals 1 and 2 
have identical initial endowments. As the initial state is already Pareto optimal, 
it can be seen that there exists a P1 such that objective welfare decreases for both 
Individual 1 and Individual 2. Individual 1's objective welfare decreases as a result 
of the exercising of autonomy by Individual 2, and the objective welfare of society 
as a whole also decreases. This may be interpreted as Pareto inefficiency stemming 
from the asymmetry of information, but the problem is that in the region where P1 
is low, Individual 2's objective welfare also decreases. This region provides a 
dramatic illustration of disruptive effect on welfare of a mistaken independent 
judgement. As P1 increases, Individual 2's objective welfare also increases, and in 
the region where P1 exceeds a certain level, Individual 2's objective welfare is higher 
than in the initial state. Individual 1's objective welfare is a decreasing function 
of P1. That is, Individual 2 is able to use the information gained from exercising 
her autonomy (independent judgement) to decrease Individual 1's welfare and capture 
it for herself. Other qualitative properties are similar to those of Case A in Appendix 
B. 
 
Case B*: where both Individual 1 and Individual 2 are of Type 2* with identical 
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independent judgement parameter P1 (= 1-P0). 
 
Assume initial endowments of E11=E21=1.0+s and E12=E22=1.0-s. Qualitative properties 
are similar to those of Case B in Appendix B. 
 
Why is it that the exercise of autonomy (powers of independent judgment) fails to 
achieve optimal benefits for the community (usually explained in terms of Pareto 
optimality), or at least lead to a preferable state of affairs? The reason is explained 
in simple terms below. 
 
As shown by the model of independent judgment in Chapter 3, autonomy (independent 
judgmental power) can be statistically expected to function as a type of information 
mechanism that increases the volume of information. However, this mechanism does not 
contain any information indicative of how predictions of a given state may be altered 
in the future. That is, as an information mechanism, it contributes to discontinuous 
alterations in predictions of a given condition only if and when a decision is actually 
produced (thus generating information of either positive or negative value). However, 
until that decision is made, it will be completely impossible to make any prediction 
whatsoever regarding future changes in a prediction. The information mechanism itself 
may be described as a new, additional stochastic variable associated with predictions 
of a state. However, from the standpoint of maximizing the statistically expected 
utility (welfare) to a community, the (competitive) equilibrium prices derived from 
models of price equilibrium under conditions of uncertainty will already reflect the 
current prediction about the state in question. Although a Pareto optimum based on 
that prediction will be achieved, it will not contain any information about 
predictions after the information mechanism has been invoked. To put it another way, 
it cannot be marginalized until subsequent predictions are made. Accordingly, each 
new equilibrium price and allocation of inputs will be achieved on the basis of 
predictions about fresh states that derive from decisions made through the invocation 
of autonomy (independent judgmental power). Additionally, the utility (welfare) 
expected prior to and after invocation will be calculated as a linear combination 
(weighted by expression probabilities) of the actual utility (welfare) achieved in 
response to the decision outcomes capable of being generated. However, in view of 
the fact that only one Pareto optimum (under standard conditions) can be premised 
on a true state (based on complete information), it is impossible for all actual 
benefits (welfare) achieved in response to possible decision outcomes to be 
representative of a Pareto optimum. Likewise, it follows that the utility (welfare) 
expected after invocation and expressed as a linear relationship will not always 
result in a Pareto optimum, nor even in a preferable state of affairs. 
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8. Final Remarks 
 
In this paper, the key concepts are "speculation" and "interaction." I sought to 
illustrate these concepts using the simplest of models. In particular, the models 
in Chapter 7 were essentially derived from the pricing mechanism in an interacting 
society or economy of two groups or two players. In its most basic form, this mechanism 
is known as the "Edgeworth box," and does not include any corporate activity. 
Additionally, I treated speculative behavior as the invocation of a type of 
independent judgmental power (information mechanism), and drew attention to its 
instantaneous and irreversible nature. I assumed that the other, more disruptive side 
of speculative behavior has already been adequately portrayed. Also, in view of the 
fact that efforts in fund management by hedge funds and other speculative 
organizations have now reached a scale too significant to be ignored by the real 
economy at large, I sought to identify the potential nonlinear "shocks" from a variety 
of risk-aversion coefficients affecting economic agents that do not possess 
independent judgmental power (information mechanisms). 
 
It is assumed in this paper that speculation is an economic behavior that involves 
acting in accord with new predictions that are based on the invocation of autonomy 
(independent judgmental power) and discontinuous jumps in the prediction equation. 
Speculative behavior was once thought to be the province of certain special types 
of people: i.e., risk-loving individuals characterized by convex utility functions. 
However, we demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7 that even people who adhere to a 
risk-neutral or risk-averse economic rationale are capable of exercising their 
autonomy and engaging in speculation. Accordingly, in this context it is also shown 
that autonomy (independent judgmental power) can have a disruptive (negative) impact 
on community welfare. 
 
The models enlisted in Chapters 6 and 7 may be described as models of price equilibrium 
in an uncertain world that internalize a degree of "sensitivity" to information. The 
findings from these models demonstrate that (overall) objective welfare is not altered 
by the invocation of autonomy (independent judgment) in a risk-neutral world, and 
that homogeneous systems with complete information do not attain equilibrium. It was 
also shown that in a risk-averse world, (overall) objective welfare may actually be 
reduced by the invocation of autonomy (independent judgment) in certain cases. In 
other words, within imperfectly homogeneous systems of individuals (marked by 
identical initial predictions and input allocations), the invocation of autonomy 
(independent judgment) will lead to variations in prediction (disruptive effect) and, 
regardless of the favorable or unfavorable nature of the situation, ultimately distort 
the portfolio balance under conditions of equilibrium, and reduce the amount of 
objective welfare. However, if the initial conditions are not identical and already 
marked by significant variation, the invocation of autonomy (independent judgment) 
will effectively consolidate the predictions of each individual in the system, 
ultimately eliminating disruptions in the portfolio balance, identifying the correct 
price range, and contributing to an increase in objective welfare. To rephrase, the 
invocation of autonomy has the effect of disrupting (reducing) objective welfare 
during the transition from a stage of predictive ambiguity to a stage in which actual 
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conditions are clearly known. However, this process eventually leads to a quasi-steady 
state of competitive equilibrium that is not necessarily Pareto optimal or even 
preferable. Furthermore, it should be noted that this process of equilibrium is 
instantaneous and microscopically irreversible in nature. 
 
From these conclusions, the implication may appear to be that the invocation of 
autonomy (independent judgment) can have negative economic value in terms of community 
welfare. However, this can happen only when within an economic system the uncertainty, 
in which an economic agent is involved, also involves another economic agent. 
Furthermore, this is because no attention has been devoted to the positive or negative 
feedback to the individual (economic agent) deriving from the accumulation of 
information by the system (community) in the course of exercising its autonomy. For 
example, that feedback may include the creation of new industrial societies based 
on widespread public recognition and acceptance of innovations in technology; the 
formation of new social rules based on a majority consensus by individuals in the 
community; factors capable of increasing the benefits to the individual in an entirely 
new dimension; or the internalization of information as a marketable commodity with 
a tangible trading price. The point, in short, is that the surplus value (if any) 
created by the accumulation of information has not been allocated among agents 
(individuals) within the system. This is an issue that will conceivably deserve 
further study and debate in terms of the (positive or negative) externality of 
information.  However, as it happens, the international financial market crisis of 
recent years has been marked by repeated cycles of speculative trading in areas rather 
far removed from trends in the actual economy. Such speculation has been fed by the 
increasing liberalization of capital flows, the utilization of breakthroughs in 
computer technology for financial trading purposes, and pure competition for control 
over information itself. In any case, this reality appears to be closely consistent 
with the model described above. 
 
For this paper, I relied on two hypothetical scenarios for the decision-making 
mechanism as invoked by individuals: an "independent" scenario on the one hand, and 
a "strategy-based" scenario on the other. Further, every effort was made to devise 
pure models reflective of considerations for the (dynamic) activation and generation 
of information by the independent system, as well as the frozen (static) 
strategy-based system, under which no information is generated. Finally, I treated 
the "predictions" deriving from each of these state models as a conceptualized 
"magnetic field," and in my analysis, sought to identify the processes of 
decision-making and price equilibrium that these models would generate. 
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Appendix A: The Economic Value of Independent Judgement (where pay-off 
function is exogenous) 
 
We now calculate the economic value of Agent i's independent judgement capabilities 
for the case where the pay-off function is given exogenously. 
 
Definition 1: Agent i's available pre-generated information set: Fi={ D1, D2,...., 
Di-1} 
Definition 2: Agent i's ungenerated result of independent judgement: Di 
Definition 3: Cost of Agent i's independent judgement: zero (Ci=0) 
Definition 4: Pay-off function: Pi(Di=k, M=j)=Pi(Si=k, M=j)=Pkj ("k, j) 
 
Also, assume AºP11-P01>0 and BºP00-P10>0. 
Definition 5: Difference between expected pay-offs of independent judgement (Di) and 
strategic judgement (Si =0,1): 
Di(I, S1)º E(Pi(Di, M)½Fi)-E(Pi(Si=1, M)½Fi) 
 Di(I, S0)º E(Pi(Di, M)½Fi)-E(Pi(Si=0, M)½Fi) 
 Di(S1, S0)º E(Pi(Si=1, M)½Fi)-E(Pi(Si=0, M)½Fi) 
 
Conditions: Di and Di‘(i¹i’) are conditionally independent. That is,  
P(Di=k, Di’=k’½M=j)=P(Di=k½M=j)P(Di’=k’½M=j) ("k,k’,j,i¹i’) 
 
The following is clear from this condition: 
 biºP(M=1|Fi)= P(M=1| Di,Fi) 
 
That is, the expected value of Agent i's forecast regarding the state, bi, is unchanged 
by Agent i's exercising of independent judgement.  
 
The economic value of Agent i's independent judgement capabilities, Vi, can be 
expressed by the following formula. 
 Vi=min{max{Di(I, S1), 0}, max{Di(I, S0), 0}} 
 
Figure A-1 shows the graph of Vi as a function of bi.  
 
As can be seen from the graph, independent judgement has positive economic value only 
when biºP(M=1|Fi) lies in the interval 
P0iB
P1 iA + P0 iB ,
(1 - P0 i)B
(1- P1i)A + (1 - P0 i)B
æ 
è ç 
ö 
ø ÷  
and is zero otherwise. The economic interpretation of this graph is as follows.  
 
Fi and Di are conditionally independent with respect to the value of M. That is, the 
values of Fi and Di are independent and uncorrelated irrespective of whether M=1 (good 
state) or M=0 (bad state). (To express it another way, the result of Agent i's judgement 
is influenced by the state M, but is not influenced by her information set Fi.) 
Therefore, when the information set Fi is pre-generated and Agent i's independent 
judgement Di is yet to be generated, generating Di would have no effect on bi, the 
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forecast regarding the state M. That is, biºP(M=1|Fi)= P(M=1|Fi , Di). (NOTE) 
Therefore, independent judgement only has positive economic value in the case where 
generating the independent judgement Di would affect (influence) the actions taken 
by oneself, or a society or organization; in other cases, independent judgement would 
not be exercised, or even if it were, the expected payoff would not increase, and 
so the economic value of the independent judgement is zero. 
 
For example, consider a committee comprised of 11 members with the same judgement 
capabilities, where majority rule applies. Suppose that each member of the committee 
makes a conditionally independent judgement regarding the state M.  
 
Suppose that 10 out of the 11 members have already made their judgements, with all 
of them judging that a certain project should be approved (Di=1, i=1,2,.....,10). 
In such a case, the conclusion of the committee, that the project should be approved, 
is unlikely to change irrespective of whether the 11th member decides that the project 
should (D11=1) or should not (D11=0) be approved. Thus, the economic value of this 
member's independent judgement capability is zero. 
 
Now suppose that of the first 10 members, 5 have judged that the project should be 
approved (Di=1, i=1,2,.....,5), while the remaining five have concluded that it should 
not be approved (Di=0, i=6,2,.....,10). In this case, if the final member (i=11) 
concludes that the project should be approved (D11=1), then the committee as a whole 
will approve the project, while the committee will reject the project if the final 
member concludes that the project should be rejected (D11=0). That is, the final member 
(i=11) holds the casting vote regarding the committee's conclusion, and only in such 
a case does the independent judgement capability have any economic value. The interval 
shown in Figure A-1, 
P0iB
P1 iA + P0 iB ,
(1 - P0 i)B
(1- P1i)A + (1 - P0 i)B
æ 
è ç 
ö 
ø ÷  
can be viewed as the range of the forecast bi for which the result of Agent i's 
independent judgement is the casting vote determining the committee's final decision. 
A1 
 
                                            
A1 It is necessary to consider a separate case where the independent judgement (Di) 
has already been generated. For example, if Di=1, bi shifts towards 1, while if Di=0, 
bi shifts towards 0. Therefore, the independent judgement holds different economic 
value than in the case where it is yet to be generated, and a dilemma arises due to 
the irreversibility of information, in that the generated (announced) result of an 
independent judgement (Di) cannot be 'unannounced' or 'ungenerated', and thus cannot 
be reflected in the price. 
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Appendix B: The Economic Value of Independent Judgement in Equilibrium 
Pricing Model 
 
In Appendix A, we showed that independent judgement can have non-negative economic 
value if an agent is able to autonomously decide whether or not to exercise that 
judgement. To show this, we assumed that the pay-off function was exogenously given 
as a function of the state and the results of a (strategic or independent) judgement. 
Let us now consider what happens in a price equilibrium model with multiple economic 
agents. 
 
In order to examine the effect on society of exercising autonomy (independent 
judgement) in a risk-averse world, we consider the case with 2 agents. We define a 
binary variable to represent the state, with M=1 representing a 'good' state, and 
M=0 representing a 'bad' state. We also consider 2 portfolios. The first is a risk-free 
portfolio. The second is a risky portfolio where the pay-off is influenced by the 
prevailing state.  
The two agents i (i=1,2) share common utility functions of the following forms. 
 ui(x1)ºg1(x1)1-a   (Portfolio 1) 
 uij(x2)ºg2j(x2)1-a   (Portfolio 2, State M=j (j=0,1)) 
 'a' represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
There are two possible types for each agent. This model differs from those of Chapters 
6 & 7 in that one type always makes a strategic judgement, while the other type always 
makes an independent judgement. 
 
Type 1: Agent has no autonomy and always makes a strategic judgement. 
Type 2: Agent is autonomous and always makes an independent judgement. 
 
Let Agent i's (i=1,2) initial endowment of portfolio k (k=1,2) and desired amount 
be denoted by Eki and xki, respectively, and define qk to be the price of portfolio 
k.  
 
An individual of Type 1 will solve the following utility maximization problem.  
 max
x1 , x2
 ui(x1i)+{aui1(x2i)+(1-a)ui0(x2i)}  s.t  q1x1i+q2x2i£q1E1i+q2E2i 
 
An individual of Type 2 who has generated Di=1 will solve the following utility 
maximization problem.  
 max
x1 , x2
 ui(x1i)+ui1(x2i)  s.t  q1x1i+q2 x2i£q1E1i+q2E2i 
 
An individual of Type 2 who has generated Di=0 will solve the following utility 
maximization problem. 
 max
x1 , x2
 ui(x1i)+ui0(x2i)  s.t  q1x1i+q2 x2i£q1E1i+q2E2i 
 
The following equations must be satisfied in order to meet the condition of 
demand=supply. 
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 x11+ x12= E11+ E12  
 x21+ x22= E21+ E22  
 
Normalizing q1 to 1 (that is, assuming that the price of the riskless portfolio is 
always 1), final portfolio holdings xkei and the equilibrium price for portfolio k, 
qke(i, k=1,2), can be determined by solving the above 4 equations. 
 
Each agent's objective expected welfare at an equilibrium is calculated as; 
  OWFeºui(x1i)+ui1(x2i)  if M=1 
  OWFeºui(x1i)+ui0(x2i)  if M=0 
   
Each agent's initial expected welfare at an equilibrium is calculated as; 
  OWFIºui(E1i)+ui1(E2i)  if M=1 
  OWFIºui(E1i)+ui0(E2i)  if M=0 
 
We also degfine a next ratio; 
    Objective welfare ratio; Roº OWFe/OWFI 
When M=1 (good state), an individual i (i=1,2) of Type 2 generates Di=1 with 
probability P1 and Di=0 with probability (1-P1). When M=0 (bad state), an individual 
i (i=0,1) of Type 2 generates Di=1 with probability P0 and Di=0 with probability (1-P0).  
For simplicity, assume g1=1.0, g21=1.5, g20=0.5, a=0.5.  
Also, if initial endowments are set to E11=E21=1.0+s and E12=E22=1.0-s and the prices 
of each portfolio are set to q1=q2=1.0, then the initial endowments satisfy the Pareto 
optimality conditions irrespective of whether M=1 (good state) or M=0 (bad state), 
and the competitive equilibrium conditions are satisfied if an initial forecast of 
a is assumed (i.e. for case where autonomy is not exercised). (Only the price of the 
risky portfolio, q2, does not reflect the true state (q2=1.5 if M=1, q2=0.5 if M=0).) 
This indicates the exercising of autonomy (independent judgement) by a Type 2 
individual acts to distort the optimal allocation of resources for society as a whole, 
and thus the exercising of autonomy (independent judgement) has negative economic 
value for society as a whole. While the case where the initial allocations are already 
Pareto optimal may be viewed as a somewhat special case, it is achieved as a competitive 
equilibrium in a situation where there is no imbalance in information (both agents 
use an initial forecast of a), and is chosen in order to focus on the disruptive effect 
of autonomy (independent judgement). (This is the same case considered in Chapter 
7.) 
 
We now consider 2 cases. 
 
Case A: where Individual 1 is of Type 1 and Individual 2 is of Type 2 with independent 
judgement parameter P1 (= 1-P0). 
 
Assume initial endowments of E11=E21=1.0+s and E12=E22=1.0-s.  
Figure B-1 shows the objective welfare ratio (Ro), as a function of P1, for each 
individual and for society as a whole when s=0, that is, when Individuals 1 and 2 
have identical initial endowments. As the initial state is already Pareto optimal, 
it can be seen that there exists a P1 such that objective welfare decreases for both 
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Individual 1 and Individual 2. 
 
Now assume that P1 is given with P1=1.0, that is, that Individual 2 has perfect 
independent judgement capabilities. Figure B-2 shows the objective welfare ratio (Ro), 
as a function of s, for each individual and for society as a whole (for the bad state, 
where M=0).  
 
Property 1: The objective welfare ratio (Ro) is a monotone increasing function of 
s for Individual 2 (Type 2). That is, the higher Individual 2's initial endowment, 
the lower her objective welfare ratio (Ro).  
Irrespective of whether the state is good or bad, in the region where the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion (a) is large, the objective welfare ratio (Ro) is a monotone 
increasing function of s for Individual 1 (Type 1). That is, the higher Individual 
1's initial endowment, the higher her objective welfare ratio (Ro). In the region 
where the coefficient of relative risk aversion (a) is small, a minimum value, s exists 
for Individual 1's (Type 1) objective welfare ratio (Ro). 
Individual 2's (Type 2) objective welfare ratio (Ro) is larger than 1, while that 
of Individual 1 (Type 1) is less than 1. 
 
Case B*: where both Individual 1 and Individual 2 are of Type 2 with identical 
independent judgement parameter P1 (= 1-P0). 
 
Assume initial endowments of E11=E21=1.0+s and E12=E22=1.0-s. 
Figure B-3 shows the objective welfare ratio (Ro), as a function of s, for each 
individual and for society as a whole, assuming that P1 is given with P1=0.8 and that 
the good state applies (M=1). The following is a summary of the properties. 
 
Property 1: Irrespective of whether the state is good or bad, and also irrespective 
of the value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the objective welfare ratio 
(Ro) for the individual with the lower initial endowment is higher than that for the 
individual with the higher initial endowment. (In other words, in a society consisting 
of 2 people with the same judgement capabilities, the poorer individual is 'better 
off' than the richer individual.) 
 
Property 2: Irrespective of whether the state is good or bad, and also irrespective 
of the value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the objective welfare ratio 
(Ro) for the individual with the lower initial endowment (E1i=E2i<1) is a monotone 
decreasing function of the initial endowment. For the individual with the higher 
initial endowment (E1i=E2i>1), a minimum value, s exists for the objective welfare ratio 
(Ro). 
 
In Case B, the two individuals possess the same independent judgement parameter, and 
in terms of information theory, produce the same amount of information. The world 
is symmetric. However, it is clear that the exercising of autonomy (independent 
judgement) may have a disruptive effect on utility (welfare). 
 
In these cases, it is not a simple matter to define the economic value of the 
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information resulting from autonomy (independent judgement). It could be defined as 
the increase in objective welfare for the individual who created the information, 
or as the increase in objective welfare for society as a whole, or as the difference 
between the increase in objective welfare for the individual who created the 
information and the increase in objective welfare for the other individual. In any 
of these cases, it is clear that the economic value of the information may be negative. 
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Appendix C: Algorithm for Equilibrium Pricing Model Incorporating Autonomy 
 
 [Model of the interactive pricing process at the risk neutral world] 
 
(Definition) 
1. Binary modes of the world; M=j (j=0,1) 
2. N agents; i=1,2, ... , N 
3. Discrete rounds of the pricing process; t=1,2,3, ... 
4. There exist a portfolio which would produce one unit of payoff at a "good" state 
(M=1), and zero unit of payoff at a "bad" state (M=0). 
5. Price of the portfolio at t=T; qT  
6. Each agent has a right to declare in public to sell or buy one unit of the portfolio 
at each round, T. 
7. Binary independent decision making of agent i at round t; Dit=k (k=0,1), where Dit=1 
is the decision to sell one unit of portfolio and Dit=0 is the decision to buy one 
unit of portfolio.    
8. Entry cost of independent decision making of agent i; Ci for one independent 
decision making  
9. Binary strategic decision making of agent i at round t; Sit=k (k=0,1), where Sit=1 
is the decision to sell one unit of portfolio and Sit=0 is the decision to buy one 
unit of portfolio.    
10. Past independent decision history (information set), which is available for agent 
i at round T; Fi(T-1)ÎF(T-1)º{Dit}t=1, ..,T-1, "i, where if agent i’ takes a strategic 
decision Si’t’=k’ at round t’, then Di’t’=k’ cannot be defined nor Si’t’ cannot be included 
in F(T-1). 
11. Expected payoff of agent i for taking an independent decision, DiT, conditional 
on Fi(T-1) is; 
 E(PiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))ºEPiT(I) 
where PiT is the payoff of agent i at round T as a function of DiT and M. 
12. Expected payoff of agent i for taking a strategic decision, SiT=k, conditional 
on Fi(T-1) is; 
 E(PiT(SiT=k, M)½Fi(T-1))ºEPiT(Sk) 
where PiT is the payoff of agent i at round T as a function of SiT=k and M. 
 
(Pricing process) 
1. At round 1, the pricing process begins. 
2. There are three choices for agent i at round T; 
 I: to take an independent decision, DiT. 
    S1: to take a strategic decision, SiT=1. 
 S0: to take a strategic decision, SiT=0. 
 
Assume that at round T-1 agent i does not take I. Agent i chooses the one choice among 
EPiT(I)-Ci, and EPiT(Sk) (k=0,1),  and declares (outputs) his or her corresponding 
decision, DiT=k or SiT=k (k=0,1), at round, T. 
Assume that at round T-1 agent i does take I. Among EPiT(I) and EPiT(Sk) (k=0,1),  if 
EPiT(I) is the highest payoff, then agent i takes I, keeps and declares the same 
decision as as t=T-1, i.e., DiT=DiT-1=k at round T. If EPiT(Sk) is the highest payoff, 
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then agent i takes Sk, and declares Sk at round T. 
3. At each round, T, if there is an excess demand for the portfolio, i.e., the number 
of agents who would decide to buy the portfolio (DiT=1 or SiT=1) exceeds the number 
of agents who would decide to sell the portfolio (DiT=0 or SiT=0), then the price goes 
up at round T+1, i.e., qT+1 =qT+e. If there is an excess supply for the portfolio, i.e., 
the number of agents who would decide to sell the portfolio (DiT=0 or SiT=0) exceeds 
the number of agents who would decide to buy the portfolio (DiT=1 or SiT=1), then the 
price goes down at round T+1, i.e., qT+1 =qT-e. 
4. At round T=Te, if there are the equal supply and demand, and any agents would not 
change his or her decision making status any more,  then the pricing process ends 
at round Te, and qe is the equilibrium price, i.e., qe ºqTe.    
      
 
Just the calculation derives;  
  PiT(DiT=k, M=j)=PiT(SiT=k, M=j)ºPkj T("k, j, T), 
 where P11T=1-qT, P10T=-qT, P01T=-(1-qT), P00T=qT 
 
Furthermore, for simplicity, we make the following definition; 
 ATºP11T-P01T>0, BTºP00T-P10T>0,  
 bTºP(M=1|F(T-1)), biTºP(M=1|Fi(T-1)),  
 XTº{(1-bT)BT}/{bTAT}), XiTº{(1-biT)BT}/{biTAT})  
 
Just the calculation derives; 
 E(PiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))ºEPiT(I) 
 =biT{P1i(1-qT)-(1-P1i)(1-qT)}+(1-biT){P0i(-qT)+(1-P0i)qT} 
 =biT(1-qT)(2P1i-1)+(1-biT)qT(1-2P0i) 
 E(PiT(SiT=1, M)½Fi(T-1))ºEPiT(S1) 
 =biT(1-qT)+(1-biT)(-qT) 
 E(PiT(SiT=0, M)½Fi(T-1))ºEPiT(S0) 
 =-biT(1-qT)+(1-biT)qT=-EPiT(S1) 
 
we define the difference of the expected payoff among I, S1 and S0 as; 
 DiT(I, S1)º {E(PiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))-Ci}-E(PiT(SiT=1, M)½Fi(T-1)) 
 DiT(I, S0)º {E(PiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))-Ci}-E(PiT(SiT=0, M)½Fi(T-1)) 
 DiT(S1, S0)º E(PiT(SiT=1, M)½Fi(T-1))-E(PiT(SiT=0, M)½Fi(T-1)) 
 
Assuming Ci=0, the same argument as in Chapter 4 derives the following conditions 
that each agent should take I or Sk (k=0,1). 
 The condition to take I: P1i-1>XiT(P0i-1) and P1i>XiTP0i     
 The condition to take S1: P1i-1£XiT(P0i-1) and 1³XiT   
 The condition to take S0: P1i£XiTP0i and 1<XiT  
 
 We make the following definitions. 
 
[Definition 1] 
The society with a complete information basis is such that: 
   Fi(T-1)=F(T-1)º{Dit}t=1, ..,T-1, "i, ("i, "T³2) 
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The society with an incomplete information basis is such that: 
   Fi(T-1)ÎF(T-1)º{Dit}t=1, ..,T-1, "i, ("i, "T³2)  
 
[Definition 2] 
In the society with N agents, when each agent can observe all of the past independent 
decisions of L adjacent other agents plus his or herself (L+1 agents in total), then 
we define L as the degree of interaction in the society. 
 
[Definition 3] 
Homogeneous society is such that all agents are identical, i.e., P1i=P1, P0i =P0 , Ci=C 
("i). 
Heterogeneous society is such that the independent decision making parameters of all 
agents are different, i.e., P1i¹P1j, P0i¹P0j  ("i≠j).  
 
Each agent's subjective expected welfare at round T is calculated as; 
SWF(t=T)ºmax {EPiT(I), {EPiT(Sk)}k=0,1} 
 
 
 [Model of the interactive pricing process at the risk averse exchange economy] 
 
(Definition) 
1. N agents; i=1,2, ... , N 
2. There exist two portfolios, k=1 and 2. The one is riskless, and the other is risky 
and is subject to the binary states of the world. (M=1 is a good state and M=0 is 
a bad state.)  Agent i has separable utilities for these two portfolios in the 
following form: 
 ui(x1)ºg1(x1)1-a   for portfolio 1 
 uij(x2)ºg2j(x2)1-a   for portfolio 2, state M=j (j=0,1) 
 
3. Initial endowment of agent i for portfolio k; Eki 
4. Discrete rounds of the pricing process; t=1,2,3, ... 
5. Price of portfolio k at t=T; qkT, where the price of portfolio 1 is always normalized 
at 1 at each round T. (q1T=1 ("T)) 
6. Each agent has to declare in public the amounts of two portfolios which he or she 
would like to hold at hand under his or her budget constraint, given the current prices 
of portfolios, qkT (k=1,2), at each round T, and given his initial endowmwnts for 
portfolio k, Eki (k=1,2). 
7. Binary independent decision making status of agent i for portfolio k=2 at round 
T; DiT=h (h=0,1), where DiT=1 is his or her conviction that portfolio 2 is to be in 
a good state (M=1) and DiT=0 is his or her conviction that portfolio 2 is to be in 
a bad state (M=0). At DiT=h, agent i declares the holdings of these two portfolios 
so that they maximize his or her utility under his or her budget constraint, given 
the current prices of portfolios, qkT (k=1,2), and given his initial endowmwnts for 
portfolio k, Eki (k=1,2), assuming the state of the world is h (M=h).      
8. Entry cost of independent decision making of agent i; Ci for one independent 
decision making. 
9. Past independent decision history (information set), which is available for agent 
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i at round T; Fi(T-1)ÎF(T-1)º{Dit}t=1, ..,T-1, "i, where if agent i’ takes a strategic 
decision Si’t’ at round t’, then Di’t’=h’ cannot be defined nor Si’t’ cannot be included 
in F(T-1). 
10. Strategic decision making status of agent i at round t; SiT, where SiT is the status 
that he or she declares the holdings of these two portfolios so that they maximize 
his or her expected utility conditionally on Fi(T-1) under his or her budget 
constraint, given the current prices of portfolios, qkT (k=1,2), and given his initial 
endowmwnts for portfolio k, Eki (k=1,2).    
11. Expected utility of agent i for taking an independent decision, DiT, conditional 
on Fi(T-1) is; 
 E(UiT(DiT, M)½Fi(T-1))ºEUiT(I) 
where UiT is the utility of agent i at round T as a function of DiT and M. 
12. Expected utility of agent i for taking a strategic decision, SiT, conditional on 
Fi(T-1) is; 
 E(UiT(SiT, M)½Fi(T-1))ºEUiT(S) 
where UiT is the payoff of agent i at round T as a function of SiT and M. 
 
(Pricing process) 
1. At round 1, the pricing process begins. 
2. There are two choices for agent i at round T; 
 I: to take an independent decision, DiT. 
    S: to take a strategic decision, SiT. 
 
Assume that at round T-1 agent i does not take I. Agent i chooses the one choice among 
EUiT(I)-Ci, and EUiT(S),  and declares (outputs) his or her corresponding decision, 
DiT=h or SiT, and his or her corresponding preferable holdings, xki,T+1 at each round 
T. 
Assume that at round T-1 agent i does take I. Among EUiT(I) and EUiT(S),  if EUiT(I) 
is the highest utility, then agent i takes I, keeps and declares the same independent 
decision as t=T-1, i.e., DiT=DiT-1=h, and his or her corresponding holdings, xki,T+1 at 
round T. If EUiT(S) is the highest utility, then agent i declares S and his or her 
corresponding preferable holdings at round T. 
3. At each round T, if there is an excess demand for the portfolio, i.e., the sum 
of portofolio 2 which each agent would like to hold exceeds the sum of each agent's 
initial endowment, then the price of portofolio 2 goes up at round T+1, i.e., q2T+1=q2T+e, 
where e is a very small value. If there is an excess supply for portfolio 2, i.e., 
the sum of portofolio 2 which each agent would like to hold is smaller than the sum 
of each agent's initial endowment, then the price of portofolio 2 goes down at round 
T+1, i.e.,  q2T+1=q2T-e.  
4. At round T=Te, if there are the equal supply and demand, and any agents would not 
change his or her decision making status nor the corresponding declared holdings any 
more, then the pricing process ends at round Te, and the deal comes into existence 
where qe is the equilibrium price, i.e., qe º q2Te.     
   
 
In case that agent i takes S at round T, he or she solves the following maximization 
problem; 
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 max
x1 , x2
 ui(x1)+{biTui1(x2)+(1-biT)ui0(x2)}  s.t  q1Tx1+q2Tx2£q1TE1i+q2TE2i 
 
Using ui(x1)ºg1(x1)1-a, uij(x2)ºg2j(x2)1-a, biTºP(M=1|Fi(T-1)), and assuming g1>0 and g2j>0 
(j=1,2), the declared holdings of agent i at the next round T+1 in case that he or 
she takes S are; 
 x1i,T+1(S)º(q1T+q2TKSi,T)-1(q1TE1i+q2TE2i ) 
 x2i,T+1(S)ºKSi,T(q1T+q2TKSi,T)-1(q1TE1i+q2TE2i ) 
 where KSi,Tº((g1/(g21biT+g20(1-biT)))(q2T/q1T))-1/a 
 
In case that agent i takes I and outputs DiT=1 at round T, he or she solves the following 
maximization problem; 
 max
x1 , x2
 ui(x1)+ui1(x2)  s.t  q1Tx1+q2Tx2£q1TE1i+q2TE2i 
 
In this case, the declared holdings of agent i at the next round T+1 are; 
 x1i,T+1(I1)º(q1T+q2TK1i,T)-1(q1TE1i+q2TE2i ) 
 x2i,T+1(I1)ºK1i,T(q1T+q2TK1i,T)-1(q1TE1i+q2TE2i ) 
 where K1i,Tº((g1/g21)(q2T/q1T))-1/a 
 
In case that agent i takes I and outputs DiT=0 at round T, he or she solves the following 
maximization problem; 
 max
x1 , x2
 ui(x1)+ui0(x2)  s.t  q1Tx1+q2Tx2£q1TE1i+q2TE2i 
 
In this case, the declared holdings of agent i at the next round T+1 are; 
 x1i,T+1(I0)º(q1T+q2TK1i,T)-1(q1TE1i+q2TE2i ) 
 x2i,T+1(I0)ºK0i,T(q1T+q2TK0i,T)-1(q1TE1i+q2TE2i ) 
  where K0i,Tº((g1/g20)(q2T/q1T))-1/a 
 
Therefore, the expected utility from taking S is; 
 EUiT(S)=g1(x1i,T+1(S))1-a+(g21biT+g20(1-biT))(x2i,T+1(S))1-a 
 
The expected utility from taking I is; 
 EUiT(I)=g1(biTP1i+(1-biT)P0i)(x1i,T+1(I1))1-a+g1(biT(1-P1i)+(1-biT)(1-P0i))(x1i,T+1(I
0))1-a+g21biTP1i(x2i,T+1(I1))1-a+g21biT(1-P1i)(x2i,T+1(I0))1-a+g20(1-biT)P0i(x2i,T+1(I1))1-a+g20(1-b
i
T)(1-P0i)(x2i,T+1(I0))1-a 
  
Each agent's subjective expected welfare at round T is calculated as; 
  SWF(t=T)ºmax {EUiT(I), EUiT(S)} 
 
Each agent's objective expected welfare at round T is calculated as; 
 OWF(t=T)ºui(x1i,T+1)+ui1(x2i,T+1)  if M=1 
 OWF(t=T)ºui(x1i,T+1)+ui0(x2i,T+1)  if M=0 
   
Each agent's subjective initial welfare is calculated as; 
  SWF(t=0)ºui(E1i)+bi1ui1(E2i)+(1-bi1)ui0(E2i) 
 =g1(E1i)1-a+(g21bi1+g20(1-bi1))(E2i)1-a 
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Each agent's objective initial welfare at round T is calculated as; 
 OWF(t=0)ºui(E1i)+ui1(E2i)  if M=1 
 OWF(t=0)ºui(E1i)+ui0(E2i)  if M=0 
 
We define following ratios. 
 Subjective welfare ratio; RsºSWF(t=Te)/ SWF(t=0) 
   Objective welfare ratio; RoºOWF(t=Te)/ OWF(t=0) 
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Appendix D: Amount of Information from Independent Judgement 
 
We calculate the information produced from the independence. Assume the binary 
communication channel as shown in Figure 1. Also assume P1i=P1, P0i =P0 ("i). 
 Then the enthropy of each variable is; 
 H(M)=-{alog2a+(1-a)log2(1-a)}ºh(a) 
 H(Di)=-{(aP1+(1-a)P0)log2(aP1+(1-a)P0)+(a(1-P1)+ 
  (1-a)(1-P0))log2(a(1-P1)+(1-a)(1-P0))}  
        =h(aP1+(1-a)P0) 
 
The equivocation of each variable is; 
 H(Di½M)=P(M=1)H(Di½M=1)+P(M=0)H(Di½M=0) 
     =ah(P1)+(1-a)h(P0) 
 H(M½Di)=P(Di=1)H(M½Di=1)+P(Di=0)H(M½Di=0) 
     =(aP1+(1-a)P0)h aP1aP1 + (1 - a )P0
æ 
è ç 
ö 
ø ÷  
       +(a(1-P1)+(1-a)(1-P0))h a (1 - P1)a (1 - P1) + (1- a )(1 - P0 )
æ 
è ç 
ö 
ø ÷  
The amount of information produced by one independent decision making is represented 
as the mutual information, I(M; Di). 
 I(M; Di)=H(Di)-H(Di½M)=h(aP1+(1-a)P0)-{ah(P1)+(1-a)h(P0)} 
  
Consider that there exist N identical agents. N agents are independent conditionally 
on M in the sense that; 
 P(Di=k, Di’=k’½M=j)=P(Di=k½M=j)P(Di’=k’½M=j) ("k,k’,j,i¹i’) 
 
Then, defining Dº{D1, D2, ... ,DN}, we get; 
H(D)=- {aB(N ,k,P1) + (1- a )B(N,k,P0 )
k= 0
Nå } log2{aP1k(1- P1)N- k + (1 -a )P0k(1 - P0 )N - k} 
 where B(N, k,P)ºNCkPk (1 - P)N- k  
H(D½M)=NH(Di½M)=N{ah(P1)+(1-a)h(P0)} 
 
Now we can define the channel capacity as; 
 C º maxa {H(D)-H(D½M)} 
For simplicity, assume the binary symmetric channel, P1=1-P0.  
Then  
H(D½M)=Nh(P0)=const., C º maxa {H(D)}-Nh(P0) 
Just the calculation shows that H(D) is maximazed at a=0.5. 
Then at a=0.5; 
C = - NCk {P1
k (1- P)N - k + P0k (1 - P0 )N - k}
2k=0
Nå log2 P1k (1 - P1 )N - k + P0k (1 - P0)N - k2ì í î ü ý þ 
-Nh(P0) 
ºCN 
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Using P1=1-P0, we get for N=1 and 2; 
 C1=1-h(P0) 
 C2=1+h({P0}2+{P1}2)-2h(P0) 
 
Shannon’s channel coding theorem says that if H(M)=h(a)<CN, then there exists a coding 
system such that in the infinitely sequential input of the variable, M, M can be 
transmitted over the channel with an arbitrarily small frequency of errors. 
For N=1 and 2, this condition is equivalent to; 
 h(a)<1-h(P0) (N=1) 
 h(a)<1+h({P0}2+{P1}2)-2h(P0) (N=2) 
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